1. Introduction.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of investment in information technology (IT) equipment and software on the world economy. The resurgence of the U.S. economy during the 1990’s and the crucial role of IT investment have been thoroughly documented and widely discussed. Jorgenson (2001) has shown that the remarkable behavior of IT prices is the key to understanding the resurgence of American economic growth. This behavior can be traced to developments in semiconductor technology that are widely understood by technologists and economists.

Jorgenson (2003) has shown that the growth of IT investment jumped to double-digit levels after 1995 in all the G7 economies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom, as well as the United States. In 1995-2001 these economies accounted for nearly...
fifty percent of world output and a much larger share of world IT investment. The surge of IT investment after 1995 is a response to the sharp acceleration in the rate of decline of prices of IT equipment and software. Jorgenson (2001) has traced this acceleration to a shift in the semiconductor product cycle from three years to two years in 1995.

In Section 2 we describe economic growth during the period 1989-2001 for the world economy as a whole and 116 economies listed in Table 1 below. We have allocated the 116 economies among seven regions of the world listed in the table. We have divided the period in 1995 in order to focus on the response of these economies to the acceleration in the IT price decline. The major developments during the first half of the 1990’s were the dramatic rise of Developing Asia and the stunning collapse of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. As shown in Table 1, world economic growth has undergone a powerful revival since 1995. The world growth rate jumped nearly a full percentage point from 2.53 percent during 1989-1995 to 3.51 percent in 1995-2001.

In Section 3 we present levels of output per capita, input per capita and productivity for the world economy, seven regions of the world and 116 economies. Our most remarkable finding is that output differences are primarily explained by differences in input, rather than variations in productivity. Taking U.S. output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, world output per capita was a relatively modest 22.6 in 2001. Using similar scales for input per capita and productivity, world input per capita in 2001 was a substantial 34.6 and world productivity a robust 65.4!

and Francesco Daveri (2002) have presented comparisons among European economies.

We have included countries with more than one million in population and a complete set of national accounting data for the period 1989-2001 from World Bank Development Indicators Online (WBDI). These economies account for more that 96 percent of world output.
In Section 4 we allocate the growth of output between input growth and productivity. World input greatly predominates in the growth of world output. Of the world growth rate of 2.53 percent during 1989-1995, productivity accounts for 0.37 percent or less than fifteen percent, while input growth accounts for 2.16 percent or more than eighty-five percent. Similarly, the higher world growth rate of 3.51 percent from 1995-2001 can be divided between productivity growth of 0.77 percent, less than twenty-two percent of total growth, and input growth of 2.74 percent, more than seventy-eight percent of the total.

In Section 4 we allocate the growth of input between investments in tangible assets, especially IT equipment and software, and investments in human capital. We show that the world economy, all seven regions, and almost every one of the 116 economies experienced a surge in investment in IT after 1995. This was most striking in the G7 economies, led by a rush of IT investment in the U.S. However, the soaring level of IT investment in the U.S. after 1995 was paralleled by increases throughout the G7, the Non-G7 industrialized economies, and Developing Asia. Doubling of IT investment also occurred in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North Africa and the Middle East with near doubling in Sub-Saharan Africa.


Table 1 presents shares of world product and regional product for each of the seven regions and 116 economies included in our study. The G7 economies accounted for slightly under half of world product from 1989-2001. The growth rates of these economies - 2.15 percent before 1995 and 2.78 percent afterward - were considerably below world growth
The growth acceleration of 0.60 percent between the two periods also lagged behind the acceleration of world economic growth. The G7 shares in world growth were 41.3 percent during 1989-1995 and 37.2 percent in 1995-2001, well below the G7 shares in world product.

During 1995-2001 the U.S. accounted for more than 22 percent of world product and somewhat less than half of G7 output. Japan fell to a third the size of the U.S., but remained the second largest of the G7 economies and the third largest economy in the world after China. Germany ranked behind the U.S., China, Japan, and India, but remained the leading European economy. France, Italy and the U.K. were similar in size, but less than half the size of Japan. Canada was the smallest of the G7 economies.


The 16 economies of Developing Asia generated more than 20 percent of world output before 1995 and almost 25 percent afterward. The burgeoning economies of China and India accounted for more than 60
percent of Asian output.\footnote{Our data for China are taken from World Bank (2004) indicators and are based on official Chinese estimates. Alwyn Young (2003) presents persuasive evidence that these estimates may exaggerate the growth of output and productivity in China.} China has surpassed Japan to rank as the world’s second largest economy and India has outstripped Germany to rank fourth. Indonesia and Korea are similar in size, but together they are only half the size of India. Taiwan and Thailand are also similar in size, jointly about one-tenth the size of China.

The economies of Developing Asia grew at 7.53 percent before 1995, but only 5.66 percent afterward. These economies accounted for an astonishing 60 percent of world growth during 1989-1995. Slightly less than half of this took place in China, while a little more than a third occurred in India. In 1995-2001 the share of Developing Asia in world growth declined to just over 40 percent, still well above the region’s share in world product. China accounted for more than half of this and India about a quarter.

The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies generated more than eight percent of world output during 1989-2001, slightly above Japan. Australia, The Netherlands, and Spain accounted for almost half of this. However, none of these approached Canada, the smallest among the G7 economies, in size. The Non-G7 economies were responsible for lower shares in world economic growth than world product before and after 1995. However, Israel and Norway had larger shares in growth than product before 1995 and Finland and Spain had larger shares in growth after 1995. Australian and Irish shares in world growth exceeded the shares of these countries in world product in both periods. Irish growth rates - 5.15 percent during 1989-1995 and 8.85 percent in 1995-2001 – compared with the stratospheric growth rates of Developing Asia.
The 19 Latin American economies generated more than eight percent of world output with Brazil responsible for a third of the total. During 1995-2001 Brazil’s economy ranked ninth in the world, only slightly smaller than France, Italy, and the U.K., but larger than the rapidly fading Russian economy. Mexico was a little over half the size of Brazil and comparable in size to Spain. Argentina was a bit more than half the size of Mexico and ranked with Australia. Argentina and Mexico, taken together, were slightly less than Brazil in size. The remaining sixteen Latin American economies, collectively, also ranked below Brazil.

During 1989-1995 the share of the Latin American economies in world growth of almost ten percent exceeded their eight-and-a-half percent share in world product. In 1995-2001 these economies had a substantially smaller share in world growth of only six percent, while retaining close to an eight-and-a-half share in world product. Brazil’s share in world growth was substantially below its three percent share in world product before and after 1995, while Chile, one of the smaller Latin American economies, had a larger share in world growth than product in both periods.

Before the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 18 economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union were comparable in size to Latin America, generating more than eight percent of world product. Collectively, these economies subtracted 24.7 percent from world growth during 1989-1995, dragging their share of world product below six percent. Before 1995 the Russian economy was comparable in size to France, Italy, or the U.K., but fell to tenth in the world after Brazil during 1995-2001. The 11 economies of North Africa and the Middle East, taken together, were also comparable in
size to France, Italy, or the U.K., while the 30 economies of Sub-
Saharan Africa, collectively, ranked with Canada.

Poland was the only economy in Eastern Europe with a positive
growth exceeded its share in world product, while Russia’s share in
growth fell below its share in world product. Growth in the sizeable
economy of Ukraine continued to languish during 1995-2001. The
economies of North Africa and the Middle East had shares in growth well
above their shares in world product during 1989-1995, but this was
reversed in 1995-2001. The economies of Sub-Saharan Africa had shares
in world growth below their shares in world product during both
periods.

3. World Output, Input, and Productivity.

Table 2 presents levels of output per capita, input per capita,
and productivity for the world economy, seven regions, and 116
economies. Following Jorgenson (2001), we have chosen GDP as a measure
of output. We have revised and updated the U.S. data presented by
Jorgenson (2001) through 2001. Comparable data on investment in
information technology have been have been constructed for Canada by
Statistics Canada.5 Data on IT for France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K.
have been developed for the European Commission by Bart van Ark, et al.6
Finally, data for Japan have been assembled by Jorgenson and Kazuyuki
Motohashi for the Research Institute on Economy, Trade, and Industry.7

6See van Ark, Johanna Melka, Nanno Mulder, Marcel Timmer, and Gerard
Ypma (2003).
7See Jorgenson and Motohashi (2004).
We have linked these data by means of the OECD’s purchasing power parities for 1999.⁸

We have distinguished investments in information technology equipment and software from investments in other assets for all 116 economies included in our study. We have employed the World Bank (2004), World Development Indicators Online, as a data source on GDP for economies outside the G7,⁹ including purchasing power parities.¹⁰ We have relied on the WITSA Digital Planet Report (1998, 2000, 2002, 2004), as the starting point for constructing data on IT investment for these economies.¹¹ Details are given in the Appendix.

A constant quality index of capital input uses weights that reflect differences in capital consumption, tax treatment, and the rate of decline of asset prices. We have derived estimates of capital input and property income from national accounting data for each of the G7 economies. Similarly, a constant quality index of labor input is based on weights by age, sex, educational attainment, and employment status. We have constructed estimates of hours worked and labor compensation from labor force surveys for each of the G7 economies. We have extended these estimates of capital and labor inputs to the 109 Non-G7 countries using data sources and methods described in the Appendix.

In Table 2 we present output per capita for the G7 economies from 1989 to 2001. We use 1999 OECD purchasing power parities to convert outputs for the G7 economies from domestic prices into U.S. dollars. In Table 2 we also present input per capita for the G7 for 1989-2001,

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⁸See OECD (2002).
¹⁰See World Bank (2004). Purchasing power parities are also available from the Penn World Table. See Heston, Summers, and Aten (2002).
¹¹WITSA stands for the World Information Technology and Services Alliance.
taking the U.S. as 100.0 in 2000. We express input per capita in U.S. dollars, including both capital and labor inputs, using purchasing power parities constructed by Jorgenson (2003).\textsuperscript{12} Finally, we present productivity levels for the G7 over the period 1989-2001 in Table 2. Productivity is defined as the ratio of output to input.

We find that output differences were primarily due to differences in input, rather than variations in productivity. Taking U.S. output per capita in 2000 as 100.0, G7 output per capita was 83.0 in 2001. Using similar scales for input per capita and productivity, G7 input per capita in 2001 was 85.8 and G7 productivity was 96.7, very close to the U.S. level. The range in output was from 64.4 for France to 100.0 for the U.S., while the range in input was from 62.2 for France to 100.7 for the U.S. Productivity varied considerably less from 87.2 for Japan to 109.6 for Canada. We conclude that differences in output per capita are largely explained by differences in input per capita rather than variations in productivity.

The U.S. sustained its lead in output per capita among the G7 economies throughout the period 1989-2001. Canada was very close to the U.S. in 1989, but fell substantially behind by 1995. The U.S.-Canada gap widened further during the last half of the 1990’s. Germany, Japan, Italy, and the U.K. had similar levels of output per capita throughout 1989-2001, but these economies languished considerably below North American levels. France lagged behind the rest of the G7 in output per capita in 1989 and failed to make up lost ground during the subsequent decade.

\textsuperscript{12} Purchasing power parities for inputs follow the methodology described in detail by Jorgenson and Yip (2001).
The U.S. was the leader among the G7 economies in input per capita throughout the period 1989-2001. In 2001 Canada ranked next to the U.S. with Germany third. France and Italy started at the bottom of the ranking and have remained there. Productivity in the G7 has remained close to U.S. levels, rising from 91.7 in 1989 to 93.9 in 1995 and 96.7 in 2001, with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. Canada was the productivity leader throughout 1989-2001 with Italy and France close behind. The U.S. occupied fourth place, only moderately above the United Kingdom. Japan made substantial gains in productivity, but lagged behind the other members of the G7 in productivity, while Germany also lagged, surpassing only Japan.

In the economies of Developing Asia output per capita rose spectacularly from 5.8 in 1989 to 8.3 in 1995 and 10.7 in 2001 with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. The range was enormous with Hong Kong outstripping the G7, except for the U.S. and Canada, after 1995 and Singapore approaching France. By contrast Asia’s largest economies, China and India, remained at 12.0 and 7.3, respectively, in 2001. These vast differences are due mainly to differences in input per capita, rather than variations in productivity. Developing Asia’s levels of input per capita were 17.2 in 1989, 20.4 in 1995, and 24.9 in 2001, while Asian productivity levels were 33.7, 40.7, and 43.1, respectively, in these years. Hong Kong’s productivity levels of 85.8 in 1989 and 90.9 in 1995 exceeded the levels of Germany and Japan, while Taiwan’s productivity level exceeded that of Japan in 1995.

China made extraordinary gains in output per capita, growing from 4.7 in 1989 to 7.9 in 1995 and 12.0 in 2001 with the U.S. equal to 100.0 in 2000. India had essentially the same output per capita in 1989, but grew less impressively to levels of 5.8 in 1995 and 7.3 in 2001. China’s input per capita – 20.3 in 1989, 20.3 in 1995, and 26.5
in 2001 - exceeded India’s throughout the period. India’s 31.0 productivity level in 1989 considerably surpassed China’s 27.6. China’s productivity swelled to 38.9 in 1995, outstripping India’s 33.4. China expanded its lead with a productivity level of 45.3 in 2001 by comparison with India’s 35.7.

The 15 Non-G7 industrialized economies, taken together, had levels of output per capita comparable to Germany, Italy, Japan, and the U.K. during 1989-2001. Input per capita for the 15 Non-G7 economies was also very close to these four G7 economies, while productivity for the group was comparable to that of the United Kingdom. This group included a number of star performers: Norway’s output per capita of 103.6 in 2001 surpassed that of the United States, while Switzerland’s input per capita of 103.5 also topped the U.S. Ireland’s productivity greatly outstripped the rest of the industrialized world in 2001 with a level of 125.0! In that year the productivity leaders in the world economy were Ireland, Canada, Norway, France, and Italy.

For the Latin American region output per capita rose from 18.7 to 21.3 during 1989-2001, input per capita rose somewhat more from 28.0 to 33.0, but productivity eased from 66.7 to 64.6. Argentina was the leading Latin American economy in terms of output per capita, achieving the level of 34.5 in 2001. Uruguay led in input per capita, reaching 52.0 in 2001. Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela had high initial levels of productivity, comparable to those of Germany and Japan in 1989. Argentina maintained a relatively high but unchanging level, while Mexico and Venezuela had experienced productivity declines by 2001.

Latin America’s lagging output per capita was due chiefly to insufficient input per capita, rather than a shortfall in productivity. However, the decline in productivity from 1989-2001 was pervasive, contrasting sharply with the rise in productivity in the G7 economies,
the Non-G7 industrialized economies, and Developing Asia. Brazil’s economic performance has been anemic at best and acted as a drag on the growth of Latin America and the world economy. Chile was a rare bright spot with strong performance in input per capita and substantial advances in productivity.

Output per capita in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was 30.0 in 1989, well above the world economy level of 18.5. The collapse between 1989 and 1995 affected every economy except Poland, reducing output per capita to 19.6 and bringing the region below the world economy level of 19.8. A modest recovery between 1995 and 2001 brought the region to 22.9, only slightly above the world economy level of 22.6. Input in the region was stagnant at 37.4 in 1989, 37.2 in 1995, and 37.6 in 2001. Productivity collapsed along with output per capita, declining from 80.2 in 1989 to 52.7 in 1995, before climbing back to 60.9 in 2001.

Polish output per capita and productivity experienced a steady advance, but by 2001 several East European countries had recovered from the debacle of the early 1990’s. In 2001 output per capita was highest in tiny Slovenia at 49.8. This reflected input per capita of 49.4 and a dazzling productivity level of 100.8, comparable to the levels of Western Europe. The Czech Republic was next with output per capita at 42.0 in 2001 and a level of input per capita of 51.4. However, the Czech productivity level of 81.6 lagged behind Hungary’s 82.5 and Slovakia’s 92.3.

The downturn in output per capita and productivity was especially severe in the economies of the former Soviet Union. Russia’s level of output per capita fell from 32.2 in 1989 to 19.3 in 1995 before

13 A comprehensive analysis of the impact of IT investment in Poland is presented by Piatkowski (2004).
recovering feebly to 22.5 in 2001. Ukraine fell from a considerably higher level of 39.6 in 1989 to 17.6 in 1995 and 18.2 in 2001. Russian input per capita remained essentially unchanged throughout the period 1989-2001, while productivity mirrored the decline in output, falling from a West European level of 91.0 in 1989 to 55.9 in 1995 before improving to 65.5 in 2001. The most extreme forms of economic collapse, followed by very weak recoveries, can be seen in the small economies of Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Moldova.

Output per capita in Sub-Sahara Africa was the lowest in the world throughout the period 1989-2001. Only South Africa, tiny Mauritius, and Botswana exceeded world average levels throughout the period. South Africa’s economy was largest in the region and generated more than 40 percent of regional product. However, South African output per capita fell slightly, input per capital remained stationary, and productivity slumped during the period 1989-2001. South African productivity in 1989 was 91.4, above the level of the Non-G7 industrialized economies, but fell to 79.4 in 1995 before climbing back to 84.6 in 2001.

All the economies of North Africa and the Middle East fell short of world average levels of output and input per capita, except for Tunisia, which closely tracked world averages. Output per capita grew slowly but steadily for the region as a whole during 1989-2001, powered by impressive gains in input per capita, but with stagnant productivity. The region grew more rapidly than the world economy before 1995, but more slowly afterward.
4. Sources of World Economic Growth.

Table 3 presents the sources of world economic growth, following the methodology of Jorgenson (2001). We have allocated growth to the contributions of capital and labor inputs and the growth of productivity for the world economy, seven regions, and 116 economies. We measure the contribution of IT investment to economic growth by weighting the growth rate of IT capital input by the share of this input in the value of output. Similarly, the contribution of Non-IT investment is a share-weighted growth rate of Non-IT capital input. The contribution of capital input is the sum of these two components.

We have divided labor input growth between the growth of hours worked and labor quality, where quality is defined as the ratio of labor input to hours worked. This reflects changes in the composition of labor input, for example, through increases in the education and experience of the labor force. The contribution of labor input is the rate of growth of this input, weighted by the share of labor in the value of output. Finally, the contribution of total factor productivity is the difference between the rate of growth of output and the rate of growth of input, including both capital and labor inputs.

The contribution of capital input to world output before 1995 was 1.12 percent, a little more than 44 percent of the rate of economic growth of 2.53 percent. Labor input contributed 1.04 percent or slightly more than 41 percent of growth, while total factor productivity growth of 0.37 percent accounted for less than 15 percent. After 1995 the contribution of capital input climbed to 1.55 percent, but remained around 44 percent of output growth, while the contribution
of labor input rose to 1.20 percent, around 34 percent. Productivity increased to 0.77 percent or nearly 22 percent of growth. We conclude that capital input was the most important source of world economic growth before and after 1995, labor input was next in importance, and productivity the least important of the three sources of growth.

We have divided the contribution of capital input between IT equipment and software and Non-IT capital input. Non-IT capital input was more important before and after 1995. However, the contribution of IT more than doubled, rising from 0.26 percent to 0.56 percent or from a little over 23 percent of the contribution of capital input to over 36 percent. Similarly, we have divided the contribution of labor input between hours worked and labor quality. Hours rose from 0.44 percent before 1995 to 0.71 after 1995, while labor quality declined from 0.60 percent to 0.48 percent. Labor quality was the predominant source of labor input growth before 1995, but hours was the major source after 1995.

The acceleration in the rate of growth of world output before and after 1995 was 0.98 percent, almost a full percentage point. The contribution of capital input explained 0.43 percent of this increase, while the productivity accounted for another 0.40 percent. Labor input contributed a relatively modest 0.16 percent. The substantial increase in hours worked of 0.31 percent was the most important component of labor input growth. The jump in IT investment of 0.30 percent was most important source of the increase in capital input. This can be traced to the stepped up rate of decline of IT prices after 1995 analyzed by Jorgenson (2001).

Table 3 presents the contribution of capital input to economic growth for the G7 nations, divided between IT and Non-IT. This is the most important source of growth, before and after 1995. The
contribution of capital input before 1995 was 1.26 or almost three-fifths of the output growth rate of 2.15 percent. The next most important source of growth, labor input, accounted for 0.51 percent before 1995 and 0.74 percent afterward, about 24 percent and 27 percent of growth, respectively. Productivity was the least important source of growth, explaining 0.38 percent before 1995 and 0.45 percent after 1995 or less than 18 percent and slightly more than 16 percent of G7 growth in the two periods.

The powerful surge of IT investment in the U.S. after 1995 is mirrored in similar jumps in growth rates of the contribution of IT capital through the G7. The contribution of IT capital input for the G7 more than doubled from 0.37 during the period 1989-1995 to 0.77 percent during 1995-2001, jumping from 29 percent of the contribution of capital input to more than 48 percent. The contribution of Non-IT capital input predominated in both periods, but receded slightly from 0.88 percent before 1995 to 0.82 percent afterward. This reflected the substitution of IT capital input for Non-IT capital input in response to rapidly declining prices of IT equipment and software.

Before 1995 the contribution of labor quality of 0.42 percent accounted for more than eighty percent of the contribution of G7 labor input, while after 1995 the contribution of hours worked of 0.50 percent explained almost seventy percent. The modest acceleration of 0.63 percent in G7 output growth after 1995 was powered by investment in IT equipment and software, accounting for 0.40 percent, and the contribution of hours worked of 0.41 percent. Productivity growth in the G7 rose by 0.07 percent, while the contribution of Non-IT investment dropped by 0.06 percent and the contribution of labor quality declined by 0.18 percent.
In Developing Asia the contribution of capital input increased from 1.75 percent before 1995 to 2.38 percent after 1995, while the contribution of labor input fell from 2.02 percent to 1.70 percent. This reversal of roles for capital and labor inputs had a slightly positive impact on growth, so that the significant slowdown in the Asian growth rate from 7.53 percent to 5.66 percent can be traced entirely to a sharp decline in productivity growth from 3.75 to 1.58 percent. Before 1995 productivity explained slightly over half of Asian growth, but productivity fell below both capital and labor inputs after 1995, accounting for less than 28 percent of growth.

The first half of the 1990’s was a continuation of the Asian Miracle, analyzed by Paul Krugman (1994), Lawrence Lau (1999), and Young (1995). This period was dominated by the spectacular rise of China and India, and the continuing emergence of the Gang of Four – Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. However, all the Asian economies had growth rates considerably in excess of the world average of 2.53 percent with the sole exception of The Philippines. The second half of the 1990’s was dominated by the Asian crisis, most evident in the sharp declines in growth rates in Indonesia and Thailand. This period conforms much more closely to the “Krugman thesis”, attributing Asian growth to input growth rather than productivity.

Developing Asia experienced a powerful surge in investment in IT equipment and software after 1995. The contribution of IT investment to Asian growth more than doubled from 0.16 percent to 0.40 percent, explaining less than 10 percent of the contribution of capital input before 1995, but almost 17 percent afterward. The surge in IT investment was particularly strong in China, rising from 0.17 percent before 1995 to 0.59 percent afterward. India fell substantially behind
China, but outperformed the region as a whole, increasing from 0.08 to 0.22 percent. The contribution of Non-IT investment in Asia greatly predominated in both periods and also accounted for most of the increase in the contribution of capital input after 1995. Both hours worked and labor quality declined after 1995 with hours worked dominating in both periods.

Economic growth in the fifteen Non-G7 industrialized economies accelerated much more sharply than G7 growth after 1995. The contribution of labor input slightly predominated over capital input before and after 1995. The contribution of labor input was 0.81 percent before 1995, accounting for about 40 percent of Non-G7 growth, and 1.26 after 1995, explaining 39 percent of growth. The corresponding contributions of capital input were 0.75 percent and 1.12 percent, explaining 37 and 34 percent of Non-G7 growth, respectively. Non-G7 productivity also rose from 0.47 before 1995 to 0.89 percent afterward, accounting for 23 and 27 percent of growth in the two periods.

The impact of investment in IT equipment and software in the Non-G7 economies doubled between the two periods, rising from 0.22 percent to 0.44 percent or from 29 percent of the contribution of Non-G7 capital input to 39 percent. This provided a substantial impetus, amounting to 0.22 percent, to the acceleration in Non-G7 growth of 1.25 percent. Australia, Ireland and Sweden emerged as star performances in IT investment, surpassing France, Germany, and Italy. Non-IT investment explained another 0.14 percent of the growth acceleration. However, the most important components of higher Non-G7 growth were the increased contribution of hours worked of 0.49 percent and improved productivity growth of 0.42 percent.

Latin America’s growth decelerated slightly after 1995, falling from 2.95 to 2.52 percent. The contribution of labor input was 1.92
percent before 1995 and 1.89 percent afterward, accounting for the lion’s share of regional growth in both periods. The contribution of capital input rose after 1995 from 0.72 percent to 0.99 percent, but remained relatively weak. Nonetheless the contribution of IT investment more than doubled, jumping from 0.15 percent before 1995 to 0.34 percent afterward or from 21 percent of the contribution of capital input to 34 percent. Productivity was essentially flat from 1989 to 2001, rising by 0.31 percent before 1995 and falling by 0.36 percent after 1995. Productivity contributed a little more than ten percent to growth before 1995, but acted as a drag on growth afterward.

The collapse of economic growth in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union before 1995 can be attributed almost entirely to a steep decline in productivity. This was followed by a revival in both growth and productivity after 1995. The contribution of capital input declined both before and after 1995, while IT investment jumped from 0.09 to 0.26. Hour worked also declined in both periods, but labor quality improved substantially.

Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa collapsed during 1989-1995 but recovered slightly, running at -1.63 percent before 1995 and 0.36 percent afterward. The contribution of labor input predominated in both periods, but fell from 2.77 percent to 1.89 percent, while the contribution of capital input rose from 0.52 percent to 0.99 percent. Productivity in North Africa and the Middle East, like that in Latin America, was essentially stationary from 1989-2001, falling from a positive rate of 0.50 percent before 1995 to a negative rate of -0.46 percent afterward.
5. Summary and Conclusions.

In summary, the world economy, led by the G7 economies and the Non-G7 industrialized economies performed at an outstanding level throughout the period 1989-2001. Latin America hovered around world average levels, while Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union descended to closely comparable levels. Sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa and the Middle East languished considerably below the world average. Developing Asia accounted for an astonishing 60 percent of world economic growth before 1995 and 40 percent afterward, with China alone responsible for half of this. However, Developing Asia remained well below world average levels of performance.

We have considered the impact of IT investment and the relative importance of input growth and productivity in accounting for economic growth. We conclude that the trends most apparent in the U.S. have counterparts throughout the world. Investments in tangible assets, including IT equipment and software, are the most important sources of growth. However, Non-IT investment still predominates in the contribution of capital input. The contribution of labor input is next in magnitude with labor quality dominant before 1995 and hours worked afterward. Finally, productivity is the least important of the three sources of growth.

The leading role of IT investment in the acceleration of growth in the G7 economies is especially pronounced in the U.S., where IT is coming to dominate the contribution of capital input. The contribution of labor input predominates in the Non-G7 industrialized economies, as well as Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East. Productivity growth was important in
Developing Asia before 1995, but assumed a subordinate role after 1995. Productivity has been stagnant or declining in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, and North Africa and the Middle East.

All seven regions of the world economy, as well as 112 of the 116 economies we consider,\textsuperscript{14} experienced a surge in investment in IT equipment and software after 1995. The impact of IT investment on economic growth has been most striking in the G7 economies. The rush in IT investment was especially conspicuous in the U.S., but the increases in the contribution of IT capital input in Canada, Japan, and the U.K. were only slightly lower. France, Germany, and Italy also experienced a surge in IT investment, but lagged considerably behind the leaders. While IT investment followed similar patterns in all the G7 nations, Non-IT investment varied considerably and helped to explain important differences in G7 growth rates.

Although the surge in investment in IT equipment and software is a global phenomenon, the variation in the contribution of IT investment has increased considerably since 1995. Following the G7, the next most important increase was in Developing Asia, but the contribution of IT investment after 1995 ranged from China’s 0.59 percent to only 0.06 percent in Bangladesh. Developing Asia was followed, in turn, by the Non-G7 industrialized economies, which encompass outstanding performers such as Australia, Ireland, and Sweden, as well as low-performing economies like Austria, Greece, and Spain. The role of IT investment more than doubled in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and North Africa and the Middle East, and nearly doubled in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Appendix

\textsuperscript{14} Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, and Pakistan are the exceptions.
To measure capital and labor inputs and the sources of economic growth, we employ the production possibility frontier model of production and the index number methodology for input measurement presented by Jorgenson (2001). For the G7 economies we have updated and revised the data constructed by Jorgenson (2003). For the remaining 109 economies, we rely on two primary sources of data:\footnote{Other important sources of data include the Penn World Table, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) telecommunications indicators, and the UNDP Human Development reports.} World Bank Development Indicators Online (2004) provides national accounting data for 1960-2002 for all economies in the world except Taiwan. WITSA’s Digital Planet Report (2002, 2004) gives data on expenditures on IT equipment and software for 50 major economies, including the G7.

U.S. data on investment in IT equipment and software, provided by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) are the most comprehensive.\footnote{The BEA data are described by Grimm, Moulton, and Wasshausen (2004).} We use these data as a benchmark in estimating IT investment data for other economies. For the economies included in the Digital Planet Report we estimate IT investment from IT expenditures. The Digital Planet Report provides expenditure data for computer hardware, software, and telecommunication equipment on an annual basis, beginning in 1992.

Expenditure data from the Digital Planet Report are given in current U.S. dollars. However, data are not provided separately for investment and intermediate input and for business, household, and government sectors. We find that the ratio of BEA investment to WITSA expenditure data for the U.S. is fairly constant for the periods 1981-1990 and 1991-2001 for each type of IT equipment and software. Further,
data on the global market for telecommunication equipment for 1991-2001, reported by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), confirms that the ratio of investment to total expenditure for the U.S. is representative of the global market.

We take the ratios of IT investment to IT expenditure for the U.S. as an estimate of the share of investment to expenditure from the Digital Planet Report. We use the penetration rate of IT in each economy to extrapolate the investment levels. This extrapolation is based on the assumption that the increase in real IT investment is proportional to the increase in IT penetration.

Investment in each type of IT equipment and software is calculated as follows:

\[ I_{c, A, t} = \eta_{c, A, t} \times E_{c, A, t} \]

where \( I_{c, A, t} \), \( \eta_{c, A, t} \), and \( E_{c, A, t} \) are investment, the estimated investment-to-expenditure ratio, and the Digital Planet Report expenditures, respectively, for asset A in year t for country c\(^{17}\).

Given the estimated IT investment flows, we use the perpetual inventory method to estimate IT capital stock. We assume that the geometric depreciation rate is 31.5% and the service life is 7 years for computer hardware, 31.5% and 5 years for software, and 11% and 11 years for telecommunication equipment. Investment in current U.S. dollars for each asset is deflated by the U.S. price index to obtain investment in constant U.S. dollars.

\(^{17}\) The IT expenditures for years prior to 1992 are projected by means of the following model:

\[ \ln(E_{c, i, t-1}) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(E_{c, i, t}) + \beta_2 \ln(y_{i, t-1}) \]

where \( E_{c, i, t} \) represents expenditure on IT asset c and the subscripts i and t indicate country i in year t, and \( y_{i, t} \) is GDP per capita. The model specifies that, for a country i, spending on IT asset c in year t-1 can be projected from GDP per capita in that year and the spending on the asset c in period t.
To estimate IT investment for the 66 economies not covered by the *Digital Planet Reports*, we extrapolate the levels of IT capital stock per capita we have estimated for the 50 economies included in these Reports. We assume that IT capital stock per capita for the 66 additional economies is proportional to the level of IT penetration. The details are as follows:

For computers we divide the 50 economies included in the *Digital Planet Reports* into 10 equal groups, based on the level of personal computer (PC) penetration in 2001. We estimate the current value $s^i_{HW}$ of computer stock per capita in 2001 for an economy $i$ as:

$$s^i_{HW} = \bar{s}^I_{HW} \times \left( P^i_{HW} / \bar{P}^I_{HW} \right),$$

where $\bar{s}^I_{HW}$ is the average value of computer capital per capita in 2001 of group I for countries included in the *Digital Planet Report*, $P^i_{HW}$ and $\bar{P}^I_{HW}$ are the PC penetration rates of economy $i$ and the average PC penetration of group I, respectively.

For the economies with data on PC penetration for 1995, we use the growth rates of PC penetration over 1989-2001 to project the current value of computer capital stock per capita backwards. We estimate computer capital stock for each year by multiplying capital stock per capita by population. For economies lacking the data of PC penetration in 1995 and 1989, we estimate computer capital stock by assuming that the growth rates in the two periods, 1995-2001 and 1989-1995, are the same as those for the group to which it belongs.

For software capital stock, we divide the 116 countries into 10 categories by level of PC penetration in 2001. We subdivide each of
these categories into three categories by degree of software piracy\textsuperscript{18},
generating 30 groups. We assume that the software capital stock-to-
hardware capital stock ratio is constant in each year for each of the
30 groups:

\[
S_{SW}^{i} = \bar{S}_{SW}^{i} \times \left( \frac{S_{HW}^{i}}{\bar{S}_{HW}^{i}} \right)
\]

where \( \bar{S}_{SW}^{i} \) is the average software capital stock per capita of subgroup
I in 2001. Since the value of computer stock per capita has been
estimated for 1995 and 1989, this enables us to estimate the software
capital stock per capita for these two years.

Finally, we define the penetration rate for telecommunications
equipment as the sum of main-line and mobile telephone penetration
rates. These data are available for all 116 economies in all three
years - 1989, 1995, and 2001. We have divided these into 10 groups by
the level of telecommunications equipment penetration for each year.
The current value of telecommunications capital stock per capita is
estimated as:

\[
S_{TLC}^{i} = \bar{S}_{TLC}^{i} \times \left( P_{TLC}^{i} / \bar{P}_{TLC}^{i} \right)
\]

where \( \bar{S}_{TLC}^{i} \) is the average current of telecommunications equipment
capital stock per capita in year t of group I for economies included in
the Digital Planet Reports and \( P_{TLC}^{i} \) and \( \bar{P}_{TLC}^{i} \) are the telecommunications
equipment penetration rates of economy i and the average penetration
rate of group I in year t.

We employ Gross Fixed Capital Formation for each of the 109
economies provided by the World Bank, measured in current U.S. dollars,
as the flow of investment. We use the World Bank investment deflators

\textsuperscript{18} The information on software piracy is based on study conducted by the Business Software Alliance (2003).
to convert these flows into constant U.S. dollars. The constant dollar value of capital stock is estimated by the perpetual inventory method for each of the 109 economies for 1989 and the following years. We assume a depreciation rate of 7% and a service life of 30 years.

The current value of the gross capital stock at a year is the product of its constant dollar value and the investment deflator for that year. We estimate the current value of Non-ICT capital stock of an economy for each year by subtracting the current value of IT stock from the current value of capital stock in that year. Given the estimates of the capital stock for each type of asset, we calculate capital input for this stock, using the methodology presented of Jorgenson (2001).

Finally, labor input is the product of hours worked and labor quality:

\[ L_t = H_t \times q_t \]

where \( L_t, H_t, \) and \( q_t \), respectively, are the labor input, the hours worked, and labor quality. A labor quality index requires data on education and hours worked for each of category of workers.

We extrapolate the labor quality indexes for the G7 economies by means of the following model:

\[ q_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Education}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{Institution1}_{it} + \beta_3 \text{Institution2}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Income1989}_{i} + \beta_5 T \]

where subscripts \( i \) and \( t \) indicate economy \( i \) in year \( t \). Education is the educational attainment of the population aged 25 or over from the data set constructed by Robert Barro and Jong-Wha Lee (2001). Institution1 = “Rule of Law” and Institution2 = “Regulatory Quality” are constructed by Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi (2004) for the World Bank; Income1990 is GDP per capita for 1990 from World Bank Development Indicators; and \( T \) is a time dummy.
Labor quality is largely explained by educational attainment, institutional quality and living conditions. The model fits well ($R^2 = 0.973$) and all the explanatory variables are statistically significant. We assume that hours worked per worker is constant at 2000 hours per year, so that growth rates of hours worked are the same as employment.

In order to provide a global perspective on the impact of IT investment on economic growth, we have been able to exploit the excellent work on development indicators by the World Bank (2004), as well as information technology expenditures by WITSA (2002, 2004). However, it is important to note that the resulting estimates are far below the quality standards of Bureau of Economic Analysis or research on OECD and EU economies. The next objective should be to develop data on IT expenditures and IT investment within a national accounting framework for the major economies of the world, both industrialized and developing.

References.


